CUBA 



THE 



, 






EVERETT LETTERS 



ON 



CUBA 



^NKYOFCOAfG^ 
1898 



BOSTON 

Geo. H. Ellis, Printer, 141 Franklin Street 

1897 






'4713 



£ 



V 



//4 



PREFACE 



i& 



These two letters are of such importance in the dis- 
cussions of to-day that it seems desirable to reprint 
them. 

Alexander Hill Everett, our minister to Spain from 
the year 1825 to 1829, was ' commissioned by Mr. John 
Quincy Adams on his election to the presidency. Mr. 
Clay was the Secretary of State who gave to Mr. 
Everett Ms commission. It should be remembered that 
Mr. Ev< net had served under Mr. Adams almost from 
boyhood, having been an under-secretary at St. Pe- 
tersburg as early as 1809. These personal relations with 
Mr. Adams make it well-nigh certain that the conversa- 
tion which is described in this letter took place at Mr. 
Adams's personal suggestion. A trained diplomatist 
like Mr. Everett would never have ventured on this 
conversation unless he were sure of the approval of Mr. 
Adams and Mr. Clay. Here is one indication, among 
many which will occur to the well-informed reader, that 
the traditions of our foreign policy, for much more than 



half a century, have looked in the direction of a certain 
protectorate over Cuba. A protectorate over Cuba in 
no sort means the annexation of Cuba as a constituent 
part of our government. 

When, in 1852, two or three of the great powers pro- 
posed to the United States, in an amiable way, that she 
should join them in guaranteeing the Spanish govern- 
ment of Cuba, Mr. Edward Everett was fortunately in 
the Department of State. The insidious proposal made 
to us then was met by the second letter here published. 

EDWARD E. HALE. 



[From Scribner's Monthly, April, 1876.] 



CUBA WITHOUT WAR. 

LETTER FROM ALEXANDER H. EVERETT TO THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Madrid, Nov. 30, 1825. 

Dear Sir, — I think it proper to make you acquainted 
with one circumstance in my intercourse with this Gov- 
ernment of rather a delicate nature which I have not 
introduced into my despatches on account of their being 
liable to be called for and published at any moment. It 
occurred in my communications with the Minister # upon 
our relations with the island of Cuba. 

It has always appeared to me, and such I believe is 
the general opinion in the United States, that this island 
forms properly an appendage of the Floridas. Since the 
cession of these provinces | an impression has generally 
prevailed throughout the country that Cuba must at one 
time or another belong to us. Indeed, this idea was 
entertained, as I have been told, by many persons of 
the highest respectability, including Mr. Jefferson, long 

*The Minister, at the date of this note, was the Duke del Infantado, 
who had been appointed a few weeks before. But the Minister referred 
to in the text was Zea Bermudez, the duke's predecessor. 

t This cession was made by Spain in a treaty concluded in October, 1820. 



before the conclusion of the Florida treaty. It grows 
naturally out of a consideration of the Geographical 
position of the island as respects the United States. 
In the hands of a powerful and active nation, it would 
carry with it so complete a control over the commerce 
of the Gulph of Mexico, and over the navigation of the 
River Mississippi, as to endanger very much the inter- 
course of our country in that quarter. Our safety from 
this danger has, I believe, long been considered as re- 
sulting wholly from the feebleness and insufficiency of 
Spain ; and it has been viewed by all as a settled point 
that the American Government could not consent to 
any change in the political situation of Cuba other than 
one which should place it under the jurisdiction of the 
United States. This view of the subject is strongly 
intimated in my official instructions. Such are the first 
considerations that present themselves in regard to our 
relations with the island of Cuba. The next in order 
are that it is impossible, in fact, — in consequence of the 
internal state of the island, the obstinate adherence of 
Spain to the Colonial System, and the growing strength 
of the new States, — that the island can remain in its 
present situation. It may be assumed as certain that 
the war will be continued by Spain for an indefinite 
period. Half a century may very probably elapse before 
she recognizes the independence of the colonies.* On 
the other hand, it is quite evident, and such is the opin- 

*In fact, the independence of Mexico was not recognized by Spain till 
Dec. 28, 1836. 



ion of the Government as expressed in my instructions, 
that, as long as the war is kept up, the situation of the 
island is in the highest degree precarious, that it is 
liable to be changed every year, every month even, and 
that it cannot remain as it is more than two or three 
years. 

The white inhabitants form too small a proportion of 
the whole number to constitute of themselves an inde- 
pendent State. The island, therefore, must assume, 
whenever it changes its present condition, one of two 
others. It must either fall into the hands of some power 
different from Spain, as probably Mexico or Columbia, 
or it must become an independent principality of blacks. 
Neither part of this alternative can be considered as 
admissible ; and a view of our present relations with the 
island presents, therefore, the following results : — 

1st. The situation of the island must inevitably be 
changed within two or three years, and may be changed 
at any moment. 

2d. No change can possibly occur without the inter- 
vention of the United States which they could regard as 
admissible. 

From these premises, it seems to follow, as a necessary 
conclusion, that it is the policy and duty of the United 
States to endeavor to obtain possession of the island 
immediately in a peaceable way. If they do not succeed 
in this, it is morally certain that they will be forced, at 
no very distant period, to effect the same object in a 
more invidious manner, and at the risk of embroiling 



themselves with some of the great powers of Europe. 
The principal question, therefore, is whether any consid- 
eration could be presented to the Spanish ministry of a 
nature to induce them to cede the island. If this were 
possible, it would appear to be the policy of the United 
States to commence the negotiation without delay. 
Viewing the subject in this light, and recollecting at the 
same time the great financial embarrassments under 
which this Government is now laboring, it has occurred 
to me that the offer of a considerable loan, on condition 
of a temporary cession of the island in deposit as security 
for the payment of it, would be as likely to succeed as 
any proposition that could be made upon the subject. 
The interest might be made payable out of the revenues 
of the island, which are said to amount to between four 
and five millions of dollars ; # and, if the money were not 
paid within a pretty long limited time, complete sover- 
eignty might vest in the United States. Considering 
the character of the Spanish Government, and their 
general system of administration, a cession of this kind, 
accompanied with an immediate delivery of possession, 
would be equivalent, as respects us, to a direct cession of 
the whole sovereignty. In the view of the Spanish 
Government, it might perhaps wear a more agreeable 
aspect. It would present to them the two following 
great advantages : — 

1st. The obtaining of a loan sufficient to meet their im- 

* The revenues of Cuba are now supposed [1876] to be twenty millions 
of dollars. 



9 

mediate wants on good terms, — a thing which seems to 
be absolutely indispensable, which there is apparently no 
possibility of effecting in any other way, on any terms, 
and which, if in reality effected in any other way, must 
be a transaction, prudentially considered, of the most 
desperate character. This advantage is by no means a 
light one, since it seems impossible even to imagine how 
this Government can get along six months without new 
resources. 

2d. The second advantage would be the assurance of 
retaining the island in the event of repaying the loan. 
Whatever confidence this Government may affect in the 
results of their colonial system, it is impossible that they 
should not be aware to a certain extent of the great 
danger to which they are exposed of losing the islands.* 
They may not be so fully satisfied, as most foreigners 
probably are, of the moral impossibility that they would 
be able to pay down fifteen or twenty millions of dollars 
twenty years hence, and might, therefore, regard a trans- 
action of this kind as considerably increasing their as- 
surance of a continued possession of Cuba. Such, in 
fact, would be the probable effect of it, if we suppose 
the Spanish Government, notwithstanding their affected 
determination never to surrender their rights, to intend, 
nevertheless, in secret, to recognize the colonies after a 
few years, should things go on in their present course. 
Supposing this to be their policy, they would obtain, by 
ceding the island to us in the way I have suggested, a 

* Cuba and Porto Rico. 



10 

complete assurance of the continued possession of it 
from the moment when the delivery to the United 
States was effected. This temporary transfer would 
secure it from the danger of attack or internal convul- 
sion while it lasted; and, upon the recognition of the 
colonies, Spain would without difficulty obtain from 
them a much larger indemnity in money than would be 
necessary to ransom the island. It is not, however, 
probable that Spain now intends to recognize the colo- 
nies at no very distant period, and I have already as- 
sumed that she does not. These considerations might, 
nevertheless, be presented to her, and, being extremely 
obvious and cogent, might perhaps make an impression. 

But, supposing this Government, as I do, to be com- 
pletely resolved upon adhering to their system, and yet 
aware of the danger of losing the island, and of the im- 
possibility of ever repaying a loan of the kind mentioned 
without recognizing the colonies, they might yet think it 
better to get twenty millions for the island than to lose 
it for nothing. 

Such are the advantages of the transaction as respects 
'Spain. As respects the United States, it holds out the 
two following, which are so obvious that I need not 
enlarge upon them : — 

1st. Complete security from the danger of any change 
in the position of the island in consequence of the pres- 
ent troubles. 

2d. The probability of an eventual acquisition of the 
entire sovereignty. 



11 

It may perhaps be thought that some of the great 
foreign powers, particularly England or France, would 
take umbrage at the acquisition by us of the sovereignty 
of Cuba ; that the probability of this ought to prevent us 
from taking any measure to obtain it ; and that it would, 
at any rate, hinder Spain from ceding it to us directly or 
indirectly. 

The weight of this objection you are, of course, better 
able to appreciate than I am. It does not strike me that 
the foreign powers ought to feel, or would, in fact, feel, 
the same repugnance to our occupying Cuba as we should 
to their doing it; and, if we consider the acquisition of 
the island by a peaceable transaction as the only means 
of avoiding the necessity of taking possession of it sooner 
or later by force, — which is the view I have taken of the 
subject, — it is evident that the repugnance of the for- 
eign powers, whatever it may be, is no real objection, 
because it must in the end be met. They would prob- 
ably be much more dissatisfied to see us occupy the 
island by force than to see us acquire it by purchase. 

These considerations appear to me to recommend very 
powerfully the policy of endeavoring to acquire the 
island of Cuba in a peaceable way; and the manner I 
have indicated seems the one which would be the most 
likely to succeed. I should not, of course, think of 
making any formal proposition on the subject without 
receiving your instructions ; and, should the suggestions 
I have now made appear to be of a nature to be acted 
on seriously, you will have the goodness to favor me 



12 

with your orders, either through the Department of 
State or in a private letter, as you may think most ex- 
pedient. I have thought, however, that there would be 
no impropriety in sounding the intentions of the Gov- 
ernment beforehand in an informal way ; and I accord- 
ingly took an opportunity of doing it in one of the 
conversations I had with Mr. Zea. After some remarks 
on both sides on the financial difficulties of the country 
and the necessity of obtaining a loan, if possible, from 
some quarter, I told him that, although I had not the 
slightest authority to offer any proposition of the kind, 
I thought it not improbable that the Government of the 
United States would make a considerable loan to that of 
Spain, and on favorable terms, on condition that Spain 
would consent to a temporary cession in deposit of the 
island of Cuba, accompanied with a delivery of posses- 
sion ; and I then stated to him some of the advantages 
of such a transaction to the two parties, as recapitulated 
above. He did not, of course, give his assent to the 
proposal, but, on the contrary, expressed the opinion 
that the king would not alienate the island for a moment 
on any consideration whatever. I did not, however, 
consider this answer as at all decisive. A transaction 
of this sort would naturally require great consideration 
in all its stages ; and the only safe and proper mode of 
treating the subject in the first instance would be that 
of a refusal. I saw that my remarks had made a pretty 
strong impression on Mr. Zea. He said that, if I had 
authority to make a proposition of this kind, he should 



13 

be glad to receive it in writing. I told him in answer 
to this that the suggestion was entirely private and per- 
sonal, that I had no instructions from you to make it ; 
that the transaction appeared to me so advantageous to 
both Governments that I had ventured to advise it with- 
out knowing whether it would be agreeable to either ; 
but that, if the king approved of the proposition, I would 
immediately write home, and recommend the adoption 
of it for the reasons which I had already summarily 
stated. 

I have since been informed in a private way that Mr. 
Zea took a written note of what I said. This conver- 
sation passed during the last interview I had with him. 
I learn that the Duke del Infantado found these notes 
among Mr. Zea's papers, and concluded from them that a 
serious negotiation was actually going on for the cession 
of Cuba. I have not yet said anything to the Duke upon 
the subject, but shall perhaps take an opportunity of 
mentioning it, and of ascertaining whether the proposi- 
tion is regarded by this Government as at all plausible. 
I shall carefully keep you informed of any such commu- 
nications that I may have with the Minister, and will 
thank you to instruct me whether you wish the matter to 
be pressed seriously or dropped altogether. It struck 
me that it would be agreeable to you to learn without 
any commitment whatever of the Government in what 
way a proposal of this kind would be received and 
treated upon its first suggestion. 

I have given you in my despatches a full account of 



14 

the progress of the negotiations with which I am 
charged. They are still in an incipient state; but the 
present appearance of them is not unfavorable. Should 
this Government, however, attempt to proceed upon its 
usual plan of delay, after all that has already passed, I 
cannot but hope that Congress will resort to vigorous 
measures. The mere demonstration would in this case 
be effectual, and would be unattended with any danger 
or inconvenience whatever. Nevertheless, violence is 
always unpleasant, even when necessary, politic, and safe, 
so that I should prefer an early termination of these 
vexatious disputes in an amicable way. It shall not be 
for want of attention on my part if this result does not 
happen. 

I have the honor to be, dear sir, with much respect, 
your very sincere friend and obedient servant, . 

ALEXANDER H. EVERETT. 






MR. EVERETT TO THE COMTE DE SARTIGES. 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

Washington, December 1, 1852. 

Sir : You are well acquainted with the melancholy 
circumstances which have hitherto prevented a reply to 
the note which you addressed to my predecessor on the 
8th of July. 

That note, and the instruction of M. de Turgot of the 
31st March, with a similar communication from the 
English Minister, and the projet of a convention be- 
tween the three powers relative to Cuba, have been 
among the first subjects to which my attention has been 
called by the President. 

The substantial portion of the proposed convention 
is expressed in a single article in the following terms : 
"The high contracting parties hereby severally and 
collectively disclaim now and for hereafter, all intention 
to obtain possession of the island of Cuba, and they 
respectively bind themselves to discountenance all at- 
tempt to that effect on the part of any power or indi- 
viduals whatever." 

"The high contracting parties declare, severally and 
collectively, that they will not obtain or maintain for 



themselves, or for any one of themselves, any exclusive 
control over the said island, nor assume nor exercise 
any dominion over the same." 

The President has given the most serious attention 
to this proposal, to the notes of the French and British 
ministers accompanying it, and to the instructions of 
M. de Turgot and the Earl of Malmesbury, transmitted 
with the project of the convention ; and he directs me 
to make known to you the view which he takes of this 
important and delicate subject. 

The President fully concurs with his predecessors, 
who have on more than one occasion authorized the 
declaration referred to by M. de Turgot and Lord 
Malmesbury, that the United States could not see with 
indifference the island of Cuba fall into possession of 
any other European government than Spain ; not, how- 
ever, because we should be dissatisfied with any natural 
increase of territory and power on the part of France 
or England. France has, within twenty years, ac- 
quired a vast domain on the northern coast of Africa, 
with a fair prospect of indefinite extension. England, 
within a half century, has added very extensively to 
her empire. These acquisitions have created no un- 
easiness on the part of the United States. 

In like manner, the United States have, within the 
same period, greatly increased their territory. The 
largest addition was that of Louisiana, which was pur- 
chased from France. These accessions of territory 



have probably caused no uneasiness to the great Euro- 
pean powers, as they have been brought about by the 
operation of natural causes, and without any disturb- 
ance of the international relations of the principal 
States. They have been followed, also, by a great in- 
crease of mutually beneficial commercial intercourse 
between the United States and Europe. 

But the case would be different in reference to the 
transfer of Cuba from Spain to any other European 
power. That event could not take place without a 
serious derangement of the international system now 
existing, and it would indicate designs in reference to 
this hemisphere which could not but awaken alarm in 
the United States. 

We should view it in somewhat the same light in 
which France and England would view the acquisition 
of some important island in the Mediterranean by the 
United States, with this difference, it is true : that the 
attempt of the United States to establish themselves in 
Europe would be a novelty, while the appearance of a 
European power in this part of the world is a familiar 
fact. But this difference in the two cases is merely 
historical, and would not diminish the anxiety which, 
on political grounds, would be caused by any great 
demonstration of European power in a new direction in 
America. 

M. de Turgot states that France could never see with 
indifference the possession of Cuba by any power but 



6 

Spain, and explicitly declares that she has no wish or 
intention of appropriating the island to herself; and 
the English minister makes the some avowal on behalf 
of his government. M. de Turgot and Lord Malmes- 
bury do the government of the United States no more 
than justice in remarking that they have often pro- 
nounced themselves substantially in the same sense. 
The President does not covet the acquisition of Cuba 
for the United States ; at the same time, he considers 
the condition of Cuba as mainly an American question. 
The proposed convention proceeds on a different prin- 
ciple. It assumes that the United States have no other 
or greater interest in the question than France or Eng- 
land ; whereas it is necessary only to cast one's eye on 
the map to see how remote are the relations of Europe, 
and how intimate those of the United States, with this 
island. 

The President, doing full justice to the friendly spirit 
in which his concurrence is invited by France and 
England, and not insensible to the advantages of a 
good understanding between the three powers in refer- 
ence to Cuba, feels himself, nevertheless, unable to 
become a party to the proposed compact, for the follow- 
ing reasons : 

It is, in the first place, in his judgment, clear (as far 
as the respect due from the Executive to a coordinate 
branch of the government will permit him to anticipate 
its decision) that no such convention would be viewed 



with favor by the Senate. Its certain rejection by that 
body would leave the question of Cuba in a more un- 
settled position than it is now. This objection would 
not require the President to withhold his concurrence 
from the convention if no other objection existed, and 
if a strong sense of the utility of the measure rendered 
it his duty, as far as the Executive action is concerned, 
to give his consent to the arrangement. Such, however, 
is not the case. 

The convention would be of no value unless it were 
lasting : accordingly, its terms express a perpetuity of 
purpose and obligation. Now, it may well be doubted 
whether the constitution of the United States would 
allow the treaty-making power to impose a permanent 
disability on the American government, for all coming 
time, and prevent it, under any future change of cir- 
cumstances, from doing what has been so often done in 
times past. In 1803 the United States purchased 
Louisiana of France; and in 1819 they purchased Flor- 
ida of Spain. It is not within the competence of the 
treaty-making power in 1852 effectually to bind the 
government in all its branches ; and, for all coming 
time, not to make a similar purchase of Cuba. A like 
remark, I imagine, may be made even in reference both to 
France and England, where the treaty-making power is 
less subject than it is with us to the control of other 
branches of the government. 

There is another strong objection to the proposed 



8 



agreement. Among the oldest traditions of the federal 
government is an aversion to political alliances with 
European powers. In his memorable farewell address, 
President Washington says: "The great rule of con- 
duct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending 
our commercial relations, to have with them as little po- 
litical connection as possible. So far as we have already- 
formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect 
good faith. Here let us stop." President Jefferson in 
his inaugural address, in 1801, warned the country 
against "entangling alliances." This expression, now 
become proverbial, was unquestionably used by Mr. 
Jefferson in reference with the alliance with France of 
1778 — an alliance, at the time, of incalculable benefit 
to the United States ; but which, in less than twenty 
years, came near involving us in the wars of the French 
revolution, and laid the foundation of heavy claims 
upon Congress, not extinguished to the present day. 
It is a significant coincidence, that the particular pro- 
vision of the alliance which occasioned these evils was 
that, under which France called upon us to aid her in 
defending her West Indian possessions against England. 
Nothing less than the unbounded influence of Washing- 
ton rescued the Union from the perils of that crisis, and 
preserved our neutrality. 

But the President has a graver objection to entering 
into the proposed convention. He has no wish to dis- 
guise the feeling that the compact, although equal in 



its terms, would be very unequal in substance. France 
and England, by entering into it, would disable them- 
selves from obtaining possession of an island remote 
from their seats of government, belonging to another 
European power, whose natural right to possess it must 
always be as good as their own — a distant island in an- 
other hemisphere, and one by which no ordinary or 
peaceful course of things could ever belong to either of 
them. If the present balance of power in Europe 
should be broken up, if Spain should become unable to 
maintain the island in her possession, and France and 
England should be engaged in a death struggle with 
each other, Cuba might then be the prize of the victor. 
Till these events all take place, the President does not 
see how Cuba can belong to any European power but 
Spain. 

The United States, on the other hand, would, by the 
proposed convention, disable themselves from making 
an acquisition which might take place without any dis- 
turbance of existing foreign relations, and in the natu- 
ral order of things. The island of Cuba lies at our 
doors. It commands the approach to the Gulf of Mex- 
ico, which washes the shores of five of our States. It 
bars the entrance of that great river which drains half 
the North American continent, and with its tributaries 
forms the largest system of internal water-communica- 
tion in the world. It keeps watch at the doorway of 
our intercourse with California by the isthmus route. 



10 



If an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish crown, 
guarded the entrance of the Thames and the Seine, and 
the United States should propose a convention like this 
to France and England, those powers would assuredly 
feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far 
less serious than that which we asked them to assume. 

The opinions of American statesmen, at different 
times, and under varying circumstances, have differed 
as to the desirableness of the acquisition of Cuba by 
the United States. Territorially and commercially it 
would, in our hands, be an extremely valuable posses- 
sion. Under certain contingencies it might be almost 
essential to our safety. Still, for domestic reasons, on 
which, in a communication of this kind, it might not be 
proper to dwell, the President thinks that the incor- 
poration of the island into the Union at the present 
time, although effected with the consent of Spain, would 
be a hazardous measure ; and he would consider its 
acquisition by force, except in a just war with Spain 
(should an event so greatly to be deprecated take 
place), as a disgrace to the civilization of the age. 

The President has given ample proof of the sincerity 
with which he holds these views. He has thrown the 
whole force of his constitutional power against all il- 
legal attacks upon the island. It would have been per- 
fectly easy for him, without any seeming neglect of 
duty, to allow projects of a formidable character to 
gather strength by connivance. No amount of obloquy 



11 



at home, no embarrassments caused by the indiscretions 
of the colonial government of Cuba, have moved him 
from the path of duty in this respect. The Captain- 
General of that island, an officer apparently of upright 
and conciliatory character, but probably more used to 
military command than the management of civil affairs, 
has, on a punctilio in reference to the purser of a 
private steamship (who seems to have been entirely 
innocent of the matters laid to his charge), refused 
to allow passengers and the mails of the United 
States to be landed from a vessel having him on 
board. This is certainly a very extraordinary mode 
of animadverting upon a supposed abuse of the 
liberty of the press by the subject of a foreign 
government in his native country. The Captain- 
General is not permitted by his government, three 
thousand miles off, to hold any diplomatic intercourse 
with the United States. He is subject in no degree to 
the direction of the Spanish minister at Washington ; 
and the President has to choose between a resort to 
force, to compel the abandonment of this gratuitous in- 
terruption of commercial intercourse (which would 
result in war), and a delay of weeks and months, neces- 
sary for a negotiation with Madrid, with all the chances 
of the most deplorable occurrences in the interval— and 
all for a trifle, that ought to have admitted a settlement 
by an exchange of notes between Washington and Ha- 
vana. The President has, however, patiently submitted 



12 

to these evils, and has continued faithfully to give to 
Cuba the advantages of those principles of the public 
law under the shelter of which she has departed, in this 
case, from the comity of nations. But the incidents to 
which I allude and which are still in train, are among 
many others which point decisively to the expediency 
of some change in the relations of Cuba; and the Presi- 
dent thinks that the influence of France and England 
with Spain would be well employed in inducing her so 
to modify the administration of the government of 
Cuba as to afford the means of some prompt remedy for 
evils of the kind alluded to, which have done much to 
increase the spirit of unlawful enterprise against the 
island. 

That a convention such as proposed would be a 
transitory arrangement, sure to be swept away by the 
irresistible tide of affairs in a new country, is, to the 
apprehension of the President, too obvious to require a 
labored argument. The project rests on principles ap- 
plicable, if at all, to Europe, where international rela- 
tions are, in their basis, of great antiquity, slowly 
modified, for the most part, in the progress of time and 
events; and not applicable to America, which, but lately 
a waste, is filling up with intense rapidity, and adjust- 
ing on natural principles those territorial relations 
which, on the first discovery of the continent, were in a 
good degree fortuitous. 

The comparative history of Europe and America, 



13 

even for a single century, shows this. In 1752, France, 
England, and Spain were not materially different in 
their political position in Europe from what they now 
are. They were ancient, mature, consolidated states, 
established in their relations with each other and the 
rest of the world — the leading powers of Western and 
Southern Europe. Totally different was the state of 
things in America. The United States had no existence 
as a people ; a line of English colonies, not numbering 
much over a million of inhabitants, stretched along the 
coast. France extended from the Bay of St. Lawrence 
to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Alleghanies to the 
Mississippi ; beyond which, westward, the continent 
was a wilderness, occupied by wandering savages, and 
subject to a conflicting and nominal claim on the part 
of France and Spain. Everything in Europe was com- 
paratively fixed ; everything in America provisional, 
incipient, and temporary, except the law of progress, 
which is as organic and vital in the youth of states as 
of individual men. A struggle between the provincial 
authorities of France and England for the possession of 
a petty stockade at the confluence of the Monongahela 
and Alleghany, kindled the seven-years war; at the 
close of which, the great European powers, not mate- 
rially affected in their relations at home, had undergone 
astonishing changes on this continent. France had 
disappeared from the map of America, whose inmost 
recesses had been penetrated by her zealous mission- 



14 



aries and her resolute and gallant adventurers; England 
had added the Canadas to her trans- Atlantic dominions; 
Spain had become the mistress of Louisiana, so that, in 
the language of the archbishop of Mexico, in 1770, she 
claimed Siberia as the northern boundary of New Spain. 

Twelve years only from the treaty of Paris elapsed, 
and another great change took place, fruitful of still 
greater changes to come. The American revolution 
broke out. It involved France, England, and Spain in 
a tremendous struggle ; and at its close the United 
States of America had taken their place in the family 
of nations. In Europe, the ancient states were restored 
substantially to their former equilbrium; but a new ele- 
ment, of incalculable importance in reference to terri- 
torial arrangements, is henceforth to be recognized in 
America. 

Just twenty years from the close of the war of the 
American revolution, France, by a treaty with Spain 
— of which the provisions have never been disclosed— 
possessed herself of Louisiana, but did so only to cede it 
to the United States; and in the same year, Lewis and 
Clark started on their expedition to plant the flag of 
the United States on the shores of the Pacific. In 
1819, Florida was sold by Spain to the United States, 
whose territorial possessions in this way had been in- 
creased three-fold in half a century. This last acquisi- 
tion was so much a matter of course that it had been 



15 

distinctly foreseen by the Count Aranda, then Prime 
Minister of Spain, as long ago as 1783. 

But even these momentous events are but the fore- 
runners of new territorial revolutions still more stu- 
pendous. A dynastic struggle between the Emperor 
Napoleon and Spain, commencing in 1808, convulsed 
the Peninsula. The vast possessions of the Spanish 
crown on this continent — vice-royalties and captain- 
generalships, filling the space between California and 
Cape Horn — one after another, asserted their independ- 
ence. No friendly power in Europe, at that time, was 
able, or, if able, was willing, to succor Spain, or aid her 
to prop the crumbling buttresses of her colonial empire. 
So far from it, when France, in 1823, threw an army of 
one hundred thousand men into Spain to control her 
domestic politics, England thought it necessary to 
counteract the movement by recognizing the independ- 
ence of the Spanish provinces in America. In the re- 
markable language of the distinguished minister of the 
day, in order to redress the balance of power in Eu- 
rope, he called into existence a New World in the 
West — somewhat overrating, perhaps, the extent of the 
derangement in the Old World, and not doing full jus- 
tice to the position of the United States in America, or 
their influence on the fortunes of their sister republics 
on this continent. 

Thus, in sixty years from the close of the seven- 
years war, Spain, like France, had lost the last re- 



16 



mains of her once imperial possessions on this conti- 
nent. The United States, meantime, were, by the arts 
of peace, and the healthful progress of things, rapidly 
enlarging their dimensions and consolidating their 
power. 

The great march of events still went on. Some of 
the new republics, from the effect of a mixture of races, 
or the want of training in liberal institutions, showed 
themselves incapable of self-government. The province 
of Texas revolted from Mexico by the same right by 
which Mexico revolted from Spain. At the memorable 
battle of San Jacinto, in 1836, she passed the great or- 
deal of nascent States, and her independence was recog- 
nized by this government, by France, by England, and 
other European powers. Mainly peopled from the 
United States, she sought naturally to be incorporated 
into the Union. The offer was repeatedly rejected by 
Presidents Jackson and Van Buren, to avoid a collision 
with Mexico. At last the annexation took place. As 
a domestic question, it is no fit subject for comment in 
a communication to a foreign minister ; as a question 
of a public law, there never was an extension of terri- 
tory more naturally or justifiably made. It produced a 
disturbed relation with the government of Mexico; war 
ensued, and in its results other extensive territories 
were for a large pecuniary compensation on the part of 
the United States, added to the Union. Without ad- 
verting to the divisions of opinion which rose in refer- 



17 



ence to this war, as must always happen in free coun- 
tries in reference to great measures, no person survey- 
ing these events with the eye of a comprehensive 
statesmanship can fail to trace in the main result the 
undoubted operation of the law of our political exist- 
ence. The consequences are before the world. Vast 
provinces, which had languished for three centuries 
under the leaden sway of a stationary system, are com- 
ing under the influences of an active civilization. 
Freedom of speech and the press, the trial by jury, re- 
ligious equality, and representative government, have 
been carried by the constitution of the United States 
into extensive regions in which they were unknown be- 
fore. By the settlement of California, the great circuit 
of intelligence round the globe is completed. The dis- 
covery of the gold of thit region — leading, as it did, to 
the same discovery in Australia — has touched the 
nerves of industry throughout the world. Every ad- 
dition to the territory of the American Union has given 
homes to European destitution and gardens to European 
want. From every part of the United Kingdom, from 
France, from Switzerland and Germany, and from the 
extremest north of Europe, a march of immigration has 
been taken up, such as the world has never seen before. 
Into the United States — grown to their present ex- 
tent in the manner described — -but little less than half 
a million of the population of the Old World is annual- 
ly pouring, to be immediately incorporated into an in- 



18 



dustrious and prosperous community, in the bosom of 
which they find political and religious liberty, social 
position, employment, and bread. It is a fact which 
would defy belief, were it not the result of official in- 
quiry, that the immigrants to the United States from 
Ireland alone, besides having subsisted themselves, have 
sent back to their kindred, for the three last years, 
nearly five millions of dollars annually ; thus doubling 
in three years the purchase-money of Louisiana. 

Such is the territorial development of the United 
States in the past century. Is it possible that Europe 
can contemplate it with an unfriendly or jealous eye ? 
What would have been her condition in these trying 
years but for the outlet we have furnished for her 
starving millions ? 

Spain, meantime, has retained of her extensive do- 
minions in this hemisphere but the two islands of Cuba 
and Porto Rico. A respectful sympathy with the for- 
tunes of an ancient ally and a gallant people, with 
whom the United States have ever maintained the most 
friendly relations, would, if no other reason existed, 
make it our duty to leave her in the undisturbed pos- 
session of this little remnant of her mighty trans- 
Atlantic empire. The President desires to do so ; no 
word or deed of his will ever question her title or shake 
her possession. But can it be expected to last very 
long? Can it resist this mighty current in the fortunes 
of the world ? Is it desirable that it should do so ? 



19 



Can it be for the interest of Spain to cling to a posses- 
sion that can only be maintained by a garrison of 
twenty-five or thirty thousand troops, a powerful naval 
force, and an annual expenditure for both arms of the 
service of at least twelve millions of dollars ? Cuba, at 
this moment, costs more to Spain than the entire naval 
and military establishments of the United States costs 
the federal government. So far from being really in- 
jured by the loss of the island, there is no doubt that, 
were it peacefully transferred to the United States, a 
prosperous commerce between Cuba and Spain, result- 
ing from ancient associations and common language and 
tastes, would be far more productive than the best con- 
trived system of colonial taxation. Such, notoriously, 
has been the result to Great Britain of the establish- 
ment of the independence of the United States. The 
decline of Spain from the position which she held in 
the time of Charles the Fifth is coeval with the foun- 
dation of her colonial system ; while within twenty-five 
years, and since the loss of most of her colonies, she has 
entered upon a course of rapid improvement, unknown 
since the abdication of that emperor. 

I will but allude to an evil of the first magnitude : I 
mean the African slave-trade, in the suppression of 
which France and England take a lively interest — an 
evil which still forms a great reproach upon the civili- 
zation of Christendom, and perpetuates the barbarism 
of Africa, but for which, it is to be feared, there is no 



20 

hope of a complete remedy while Cuba remains a Span- 
ish colony. 

But, whatever may be thought of these last sugges- 
tions, it would seem impossible for any one who reflects 
upon the events glanced at in this note to mistake the 
law of American growth and progress, or think it can 
be ultimately arrested by a convention like that pro- 
posed. In the judgment of the President, it would be 
as easy to throw a dam from Cape Florida to Cuba, in 
the hope of stopping the flow of the gulf stream, as to- 
attempt, by a compact like this, to fix the fortunes of 
Cuba "now and for hereafter;" or, as expressed in the 
French text of the convention, "for the present as for 
the future," (pour le present comme pour l'avenir,) 
that is, for all coming time. The history of the past — 
of the recent past — affords no assurance that twenty 
years hence France or England will even wish that 
Spain should retain Cuba; and a century hence, judg- 
ing of what will be from what has been, the pages 
which record this proposition will, like the record of 
the family compact between France and Spain, have no 
interest bat for the antiquary. 

Even now the President cannot doubt that both 
France and England would prefer any change in the 
condition of Cuba to that which is most to be appre- 
hended, viz. : an internal convulsion which should 
renew the horrors and the fate of San Domingo. 

I will intimate a final objection to the proposed 



21 

convention. M. de Turgot and Lord Malmesbury 
put forward, as the reason for entering into such 
.a compact, "the attacks which have lately been made 
on the island of Cuba by lawless bands of adventurers 
irom the United States, with the avowed design of tak- 
ing possession of that island." The President is con- 
vinced that the conclusion of such a treaty, instead of 
putting a stop to these lawless proceedings, would give 
a. new and powerful impulse to them. It would strike 
a death-blow to the conservative policy hitherto pur- 
sued in this country toward Cuba. No administration 
of this government, however strong in the public con- 
fidence in other respects, could stand a day under the 
odium of having stipulated with the great powers of 
Europe, that in no future time, under no change of cir- 
cumstances, by no amicable arrangement with Spain, 
by no act of lawful war (should that calamity unfortu- 
nately occur), by no consent of the inhabitants of the 
island, should they, like the possessions of Spain on the 
American continent, succeed in rendering themselves 
independent; in fine, by no over-ruling necessity of 
self-preservation should the United States make the 
acquisition of Cuba. 

For these reasons, which the President has thought 
it advisable, considering the importance of the subject, 
to direct me to unfold at some length, he feels con- 
strained to decline respectfully the invitation of France 
and England to become parties to the' proposed conven- 



22 



tion. He is pursuaded that these friendly powers will 
not attribute this refusal to any insensibility on his part 
to the advantages of the utmost harmony between the 
great maritime States on a subject of such importance. 
As little will Spain draw any unfavorable inference 
from this refusal ; the rather, as the emphatic disclaimer 
of any designs against Cuba on the part of this govern- 
ment, contained in the present note, affords all the as- 
surance which the President can constitutionally, or to 
any useful purpose, give, of a practical concurrence with 
France and England in the wish not to disturb the pos- 
session of that island by. Spain. 

I avail myself, sir, of this opportunity to assure you 
of my distinguished consideration. 

EDWARD EVERETT. 



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